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I. INTRODUCTION
Extradition is the procedure whereby one nation requests an-
other to surrender an individual who is accused or convicted of a
criminal offense. The purpose of extradition is to bring the individual
within the requesting country's boundaries in order to make a deter-
mination of guilt or innocence, or to impose punishment.' This prac-
tice has existed within the United States since the country's origin,
and internationally since the first diplomatic agreement. 2 Over the
past one hundred years, there has been a dramatic increase in the
number of United States and international extradition cases. This in-
crease is due to both technological advances in transportation and the
rise in transnational crimes. 3 The case law that has developed out of
this increase is both ambiguous and contradictory. 4 One possible ex-
planation for this ambiguity is the limited United States legislation on
the issue of extradition.5 Additionally, most United States Supreme
Court cases on extradition were decided during a period when "con-
stitutional safeguards of the criminal procedure were undeveloped
and meager, and due process meant something less than it does
1. The United States defined extradition to be "the surrender by one nation to another
of an individual accused or convicted of an offense outside of its own territory and within the
territorial jurisdiction of the other which, being competent to try and punish him, demands the
surrender." 18 U.S.C.A. § 3181 (1988).
2. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, REPORT ON THE EXTRADITION ACT OF 1984 TO-
GETHER WITH ADDITIONAL VIEWs, H.R. REP. No. 998, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1984) [here-
inafter EXTRADITION AT REPORT].
3. Id. at 2.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 210-226. After extensive work by both the House
and Senate between 1981 and 1983, the Reagan administration refused to implement legislative
reform and instead resolved to use treaty revision in solving the current problems. EXTRADI-
TION ACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 2.
5. For a review of what arguably constitutes "piece meal legislation" on extradition, see
1 M.C. BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION: UNITED STATES LAW AND PRACTICE
41-42 (1981). See also Kester, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J.
1441, 1442 (1988).
1009
Loy. L.A. Int7 & Comp. L.J.
today. "6
Existing United States case law on extradition does not comport
with current notions of due process. 7 For example, extradition pro-
ceedings are not appealable by either party.8 Therefore, "wrong" de-
cisions cannot be reversed upon review by a higher court.9
Consequently, the only recourse for the requesting country is to file
subsequent complaints with different courts or magistrates, searching
for a more favorable result.' 0 Moreover, habeas corpus review is the
only recourse for an individual facing an extradition order. Habeas
corpus review does not determine the guilt or innocence of an individ-
ual; rather, it determines if a prisoner's liberty is being restrained in
violation of due process." Under current habeas corpus procedures,
prisoners awaiting release or extradition may be subjected to endless
litigation. This is due to the extraditing country's ability to reapply to
other courts or magistrates for extradition. These procedures are
clearly inconsistent with due process principles.
Second, and more important, United States courts violate due
process when they refuse to inquire into the mistreatment that the
requesting country may inflict upon an extraditee. This type of re-
view is known as "judicial inquiry."' 12 The issue of whether the extra-
diting country should engage in judicial inquiry has been the subject
of vehement debate among United States courts and the United States
Congress. 13 The House Committee on the Judiciary recently de-
scribed judicial inquiry as an affirmative duty, upon motion by the
individual, for the court to inquire into the possibility of any funda-
mental unfairness an extraditee may receive if he or she is returned to
the extraditing country.' 4 Specifically, under the proposed Extradi-
tion Act of 1984, a court performing judicial inquiry would consider
whether there is a possibility that the extraditee would be denied the
right to: (1)-an independent and impartial tribunal; (2) a conviction
based on individual responsibility; (3) the prohibition of ex post facto
liability or penalty; (4) be present at trial; (5) a bar against compul-
6. Kester, supra note 5, at 1442.
7. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1; see Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976); see also
infra text accompanying notes 227-242.
8. In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
9. Id.
10. Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 894, 907 (2d Cir. 1973).
11. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 638 (5th ed. 1979).
12. EXTRADITION ACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 6.
13. Id. at 1.
14. Id. at 6.
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sory or tortured self-incrimination; or (6) present a defense. 5 How-
ever, United States courts have refused to conduct judicial inquiry
into the possibility of unfair treatment by the requesting country.
Rather, the courts simply have adopted the rule of "judicial non-in-
quiry," which is an affirmative decision by the courts not to inquire
into the potential mistreatment of an extraditee.16 Although the Sec-
retary of State presumably conducts inquiry into such treatment,
there is an inherent conflict of interest between the Executive's duty
to accomplish foreign policy imperatives and simultaneously to main-
tain the fundamental protections of the Bill of Rights.17 Conse-
quently, many courts have considered imposing mandatory judicial
inquiry as a means of alleviating this conflict.
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York is the most recent court to consider whether judicial in-
quiry should be performed in extradition cases. In Gill & Sandhu v.
Imundi,18 the district court held that, as a habeas court,' 9 it lacked
the power to direct further inquiry into the possible mistreatment of
extraditees. 20 The court reasoned that its ability to conduct such an
inquiry was foreclosed by the Second Circuit's decision in Ahmad v.
Wigen. 2' However, the Gill & Sandhu court did not address whether
judicial non-inquiry violated the extraditee's right to due process of
law.
This Note briefly examines the historical background of extradi-
tion law. It then considers Gill & Sandhu and the court's ultimate
decision to forego judicial inquiry. This Note next discusses the cur-
rent attitude of United States courts toward judicial inquiry. It also
discusses Congress' proposed solutions to the current ambiguities sur-
rounding judicial inquiry. Finally, this Note proposes that federal
courts perform judicial inquiry into potential mistreatment of ex-
traditees simultaneously with the initial extradition hearings.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 534 (1980).
18. 747 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
19. Habeas court refers to a federal court reviewing writs of habeas corpus. Such writs
request the court to release the petitioner from unlawful imprisonment. BLACK'S LAW Dic-
TIONARY 638 (5th ed. 1979).
20. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1049.
21. 910 F.2d 1063 (1990). The court in Ahmad held that it is beyond the scope of review
of a habeas court to inquire into potential mistreatment of extraditees. Id at 1066.
1991] 1011
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II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Both the United States Congress and the courts have considered
the question of whether a court hearing an extradition case should
conduct judicial inquiry. Yet, neither branch of government has re-
quired that a court conduct such an inquiry.22
The proposed Extradition Act of 198423 at one time included a
clause that would have imposed an affirmative duty on courts to in-
quire into the potential unfairness that extraditees could experience
upon their return to the requesting country. 24  That clause was
stricken from the text of the law before the final version was proposed
in 1984.25 However, two "Additional Views ' 26 were attached to the
final version of the Act: one written by members of Congress favoring
judicial inquiry and the other written by those opposing it.27 By at-
taching these "Additional Views," Congress signaled that the issue of
judicial inquiry was not completely closed.
The group favoring judicial inquiry argued that Congress should
impose an affirmative duty on courts to inquire into subsequent treat-
ment of extraditees. 28 This group claimed that the federal courts
"may serve as a buffer for the Executive branch" by transferring the
controversial issue into a nonpolitical branch of government. 29 The
group further contended that "our country would be better off to have
initial decisions" made by the courts, in order to insulate the execu-
tive branch from conflicting interests and to "further foreign relations
rather than strain them."' 30 This group feared that the present system
22. The federal statutory law which governs extradition is silent on the issue of judicial
inquiry. See 18 US.C.A. § 3184 (1988).
23. EXTRADTON ACT REPORT, supra note 2. In 1981, several bills were introduced in
both the Senate and the House. The bills were consolidated and modified by several different
committees in an effort to perfect the Extradition Act of 1984. However, this final version was
never passed.
24. Id. at 46-56. The proposed act read: "(2) The court shall not order the person extra-
ditable after a hearing under this section if the court finds... (D)... the person has estab-
lished by a preponderance of the evidence that such person ...(ii) would as a result of
extradition, be subjected to fundamental unfairness." Id. at 52.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 58-67. Two separately submitted reports called "Additional Views" accom-
panined the House Report.
27. Id. at 58, 65. The two attached sets of Additional Views primarily discussed the
imposition of an affirmative duty on courts to inquire into subsequent treatment of extraditees
in the requesting countries.
28. Id at 58.
29. Id. at 63.
30. Id at 64.
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of non-inquiry pays too little attention to humanitarian factors and
too much attention to political considerations.31 As one commenta-
tor wrote, the "State Department has its own agenda, and protecting
the rights of putative felons does not rank very high on it.
' 32
Those opposing judicial inquiry reasoned that non-inquiry is a
black letter rule.33 They also argued that the courts do not engage in
judicial inquiry because they lack the ability, resources, and time to
assess the requesting countries' procedures. 34 They stated that if
courts conducted judicial inquiry, it would "harm foreign rela-
tions."'3 It was preferable, they argued, for the courts to defer to the
Secretary of State, who could "make an informed decision" while
avoiding publicity. 36 Adherents of this view asserted that the Secre-
tary of State would not pursue extradition requests on political mo-
tives.37 With the lines of disagreement so clearly drawn, the
Extradition Act of 1984 never passed.
Early United States Supreme Court cases did not require courts
to inquire into the potential mistreatment of extraditees by requesting
countries.38 In Glucksman v. Henkel,39 Justice Holmes stated that
courts are "bound by the existence of an extradition treaty to assume
that the trial will be fair." 4 In essence, Justice Holmes declared that
courts cannot conduct judicial inquiry because when the United
States enters into an extradition treaty with another country, both
countries impliedly agree to act in a fundamentally fair manner.
Therefore, if a requesting country presents enough reasonable evi-
dence to allege that an individual is guilty, the country holding that
individual4' should surrender him or her in accordance with the
31. For a review of the traditional executive role in the extradition process, see Note,
Extradition Reform: The Role of the Judiciary in Protecting the Rights of a Requested Individ-
ual, 9 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 293, 293-300 (1986).
32. Kester, supra note 5, at 1485.
33. EXTRADMON ACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 65-66. Examination of the legislative
history and current case law indicates that the issue is not entirely settled. Id; see also supra
text accompanying note 22.




38. See 18 U.S.C.A. § 3184 (1988) (pointing out earlier cases and their reluctance to
mention the issue).
39. 221 U.S. 508 (1912).
40. Id. at 512. In Glucksman, the Court upheld the petitioner's extradition to Russia,
even though the petitioner alleged that trial in the Soviet Union would be unfair. Id. at 508.
41. The country holding the extraditee during the proceedings is termed the "relating
country" or "relator."
10131991]
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treaty provisions.42
In Gallina v. Fraser,43 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals noted
that it had "discovered no case authorizing a federal court, in a
habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition from the United
States to a foreign nation, to inquire into the procedures which await
the relator upon extradition."" After seemingly dismissing the no-
tion of judicial inquiry, 45 the court stated that it could "imagine situa-
tions where the relator, upon extradition, would be subject to
procedures or punishment so antipathetic to a federal court's sense of
decency as to require reexamination of the principle" of judicial non-
inquiry.4s Subsequent courts have interpreted this language to pre-
serve the courts' power to make inquiry into the mistreatment of ex-
traditees in extreme circumstances. 47 Although several post-Gallina
opinions have cited this dictum,48 all of them have rejected judicial
inquiry.49
In 1990, the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in Gill & Sandhu v. Imundi ° again considered
whether a court should inquire into the treatment of an extradited
individual in the requesting country. A discussion of the Gill &
Sandhu v. Imundi case follows.
III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Facts of Gill & Sandhu 51
In early 1987, the government of India requested the United
42. Glucksman, 221 U.S. at 512.
43. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960).
44. Id. at 78 (citing Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. 540, 568 (1840); Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S.
181, 184 (1902); Ex parte La Mantia, 206 F. 330 (S.D.N.Y. 1913)).
45. In Gallina, the court found the defendant was not exposed to fundamental unfairness
because he was represented by counsel at the trial (although the defendant was not present)
and his alleged cohorts were present and also convicted. 278 F.2d at 77.
46. Id at 79.
47. See, eg., Arnbjomsdottir-Mendler v. United States, 721 F.2d 679 (9th Cir. 1983); In
re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 672 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
48. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Ferrandina, 478 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1973); In re Burt, 737 F.2d
1485 (7th Cir. 1984).
49. Kester, supra note 5, at 1479-80. The Ninth Circuit also noted that "[t]his exception
has yet to be employed in an extradition case." Arnbjornsdottir-Mendler, 721 F.2d at 683.
50. 747 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
51. The case of Gill and Sandhu consists of several different published opinions. Both a
magistrate and a judge worked on the various portions. See In re Singh, In re Gill, 123 F.R.D.
140 (D.N.J. 1988); In re Singh, In re Gill, 123 F.R.D. 127 (D.N.J. 1987); Gill v. Imundi, 715
F. Supp. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); and Gill v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
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States to extradite Ranjit Singh Gill and Sukhminder Singh Sandhu,
claiming that the two were responsible for robberies and murders
committed in the Punjab, in India.52 The Indian government claimed
that in early 1985, in the midst of the Punjab uprising, three armed
men robbed the Punjab National Bank at Ahmedabad, India.5 3 The
Indian government alleged that Gill and Sandhu were accomplices in
these crimes.5 4 Subsequently, in July 1985, a member of the Indian
Parliament, his wife, and a constituent were murdered. 55 Two police
officers and an Indian Army General were shot and killed the follow-
ing year. 56 On May 14, 1987, Gill and Sandhu were apprehended in
New Jersey by United States officers.57 The Indian government there-
after filed complaints in the United States seeking extradition of Gill
and Sandhu pursuant to 18 U.S.C. section 3184.58
An extradition hearing was held before a United States magis-
trate to determine whether the United States should comply with In-
dia's extradition requests. 59 Gill and Sandhu argued that if the
United States returned them to India, they would "face torture and/
or murder upon their return to India" and would be unable to secure
a fair trial.6° They presented evidence showing that the Indian gov-
ernment had engaged in unabashed terrorism against the Sikhs 61 by
52. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1031.
53. Id. From 1984 to the present, a political "uprising" has been occurring in the Pun-
jab, India. The uprising originated during the period of partition, when observers of the Sikh
religion began articulating their demands for a separate state, Khalistan. In re Singh, 123
F.R.D. 108, 120 (D.N.J. 1987). For a general history of the period preceding and following
partition, see L. COLLINS & D. LAPIERRE, FREEDOM AT MIDNIGHT (1975).
There are reports that in June of 1984, the Indian Army, Navy, Air Force, and paramili-
tary units launched an attack in the holy city of Amritsar. In re Singh, 123 F.R.D. at 120-21.
Defendants contended that more than seventy political occurrences constituted an "uprising."
Id. There are also reports that the entire Punjab state was placed under martial law, commu-
nication lines were cut, and Sikh villages surrounding Amritsar were attacked by the Indian
forces. Id. Shortly after these occurrences, anti-Sikh riots erupted during which thousands of
Sikhs were lynched, and Sikh homes and temples were attacked and burned. Id.
54. Gill and Sandhu, who are members of the Sikh religion, were fearful that they would
be persecuted in India and would be prosecuted for these crimes, which they maintained they
did not commit. For those reasons, they fled to the United States. In re Singh, In re Gill, 123
F.R.D. at 155 n.10.
55. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1031.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. 18 U.S.C.A. section 3184 codifies modern extradition law as written in 1882,
which allowed extradition proceedings upon complaints made under oath when requested.
59. In re Singh, In re Gill, 123 F.R.D. at 108.
60. Id. at 127.
61. Id. at 128.
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making arbitrary arrests, engaging in sadistic torture, and committing
cold-blooded murders of young Sikh men.62 Specifically, Gill and
Sandhu submitted an affidavit of a former Indian Justice of the Hary-
ana High Court, the Honorable Ajit Singh Bains, which described
"systematic patterns of arbitrary torture of those in custody, the lay-
ing of false charges, and the summary execution of those in custody
... staged by police."'63 Additionally, Amnesty International filed an
amicus brief outlining similar human rights violations.64
Magistrate Ronald J. Hedges, however, found that he could not
consider evidence of the mistreatment to which Gill and Sandhu
could be subjected if returned to India.65 He reasoned that section
3186 implicitly reserved judicial inquiry for the Secretary of State. 6
The magistrate noted that in Quinn v. Robinson,67 the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that "it is clear that the Secretary of State has
sole discretion ... to refuse extradition on humanitarian grounds be-
cause of the procedures or treatment that await a surrendered fugi-
tive." 68 Consequently, the magistrate refused to conduct judicial
inquiry and ordered the extradition of Gill and Sandhu. 69 Gill and
Sandhu subsequently petitioned for release and filed writs of habeas
corpus in the United States District Court for the Southern District of
New York.70
B. Reasoning of the Court
On habeas review, the district court granted the writs of habeas
corpus. 71 However, the court stayed their release pending an appeal
by the Indian government.72 In reaching his decision, Judge Robert J.
Sweet considered four primary issues: (1) the scope of the district
courts' review of extradition proceedings; (2) the fairness of the hear-
ing procedures; (3) the probable cause determination; and (4) the pos-
62. Id. at 129.
63. Id.
64. In re Singh, In re Gill, 123 F.R.D. at 129.
65. Id. at 137.
66. Id. at 129-30.
67. 783 F.2d 776 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 882 (1986).
68. In re Singh, In re Gill, 123 F.R.D. at 130 (citing Quinn v. Robinson, 783 F.2d 776,
789-90 (9th Cir. 1986)).
69. Id. at 140.
70. Gill & Sandhu v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028, 1036 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
71, Id. at 1031.
72. Id. at 1046.
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sible antipathetic treatment awaiting Gill and Sandhu in India.
73
1. The Nature of Extradition Determination and the
Scope of Review
The court announced that the nature of extradition determina-
tion and the scope of review by habeas courts in extradition cases is
fairly narrow. According to Judge Sweet, it is not the court's role to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused, but rather to deter-
mine "whether there is competent evidence to support a reasonable
belief that the defendant was guilty of crimes charged."' 74 This pro-
cess of review merely allows the extraditee to "test the legality of the
extradition proceedings. ' 75 The process does not constitute a "re-
hearing of what the certification magistrate or judge already has de-
cided."' 76 In addition, the court stated that the ultimate decision to
surrender the accused to the requesting country rests solely with the
Secretary of State.
77
2. The Fairness of Extradition Hearings
Gill and Sandhu argued that their extradition hearing was unfair
because the magistrate: (1) limited the scope of discovery; (2) failed to
make a determination of the credibility and the reliability of the evi-
dence; and (3) treated the case in a biased and partial manner.
78
First, Gill and Sandhu argued that their claim that India lacked
probable cause to extradite was defeated because the magistrate per-
mitted only limited discovery. 79 The court stated that "an accused
has no confirmed right at an extradition proceeding to present evi-
dence that contradicts the requesting party's case."80 The court ex-
plained that although a magistrate has discretion to allow more
extensive discovery, he or she is not under a duty to do so.81 In fact,
the court stated, a magistrate has lawful discretion to deny completely
73. Id. at 1038-50.
74. Id. at 1038.
75. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1039 (quoting Wacker v. Bison, 348 F.2d 602, 606
(5th Cir. 1965)).
76. Id (quoting Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1066 (2d Cir. 1990)).
77. Id. "[Tlhe Secretary of State is not bound to extradite even if the certificate is
granted." United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, 499 n.10 (2d Cir. 1986).
78. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1039.
79. Id.
80. Id at 1040.
81. Id.
10171991]
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a request for discovery.8 2
Second, Gill and Sandhu claimed that the magistrate failed to
make a determination of the credibility and reliability of the evidence
offered. Such a determination, the defendants argued, was essential to
ensure the fairness of the hearing by exposing the fraudulent nature of
the Indian government's affidavits. 83 The district court responded
that although "a different magistrate may have conceived of the scope
of its inquiry in broader terms... [failure to do so] in no way estab-
lishes that [this] Magistrate ... abused his discretion. ' '84
Finally, Gill and Sandhu argued that their extradition hearing
was unfair because of the bias and partiality implicit in the magis-
trate's failure to vacate the proceedings upon an unopposed motion.85
They also argued that requiring shackles and leg irons as security
measures in response to manufactured threats additionally prejudiced
them.86 Despite these contentions, the court found that the costs of
rehearing would outweigh any benefits,87 and that the evidence was
insufficient to show that the magistrate was biased.,
3. The Probable Cause Determination
The district court also reviewed the magistrate's determination of
probable cause. 9 The court stated that although a reviewing court
may not rehear the merits of an extradition hearing, it must determine
whether the magistrate relied on "competent evidence sufficient to
support the conclusion that a reasonable person would believe the pe-
titioners [were] guilty." 9 However, a habeas court's discretion to
challenge and reverse the magistrate's factual determination is lim-
ited. The court stated that a habeas court could not "superimpose its
view of the record on that of the extradition magistrate." 91
Nonetheless, the Gill & Sandhu court reversed the magistrate's
82. Id. at 1041.
83. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1041.
84. Id The unopposed motion was made by the United States and Indian governments
to vacate the magistrate's certifications. Id.
85. Id
86. Id. at 1035. Both the magistrate and United States Attorney received typewritten
threats during the course of the hearing. The Federal Bureau of Investigation later determined
that the United States Attorney manufactured the threats and disciplined her. Id
87. Id at 1042.
88. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1042-43.
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determination of probable cause.92 The court reached this conclusion
following the Indian Supreme Court's ruling that Gill and Sandhu's
confession, which the United States magistrate heavily relied on to
establish the probable guilt of the two men, was "not voluntary...
[and] was not true."' 93 The court declared that this evidence was of
"considerable, potential relevance." 94 The court noted that the state-
ments found in the fraudulent affidavits of the Indian government
would not have been admissible in an Indian court, so the United
States magistrate should not have relied upon them in making his de-
termination.95 Thus, the district court reversed the magistrate's ex-
tradition order and held that the United States would not return Gill
and Sandhu to India. 96 However, the court stayed their release pend-
ing reapplication by the Indian government. 97
4. Judicial Inquiry into Anticipated Antipathetic Treatment
The district court also examined the issue of judicial inquiry into
the potential mistreatment of Gill and Sandhu upon their return to
India.98 Gill and Sandhu presented evidence that the Indian govern-
ment had previously fabricated charges against them.99 In addition,
Gill and Sandhu submitted evidence of deaths occurring during custo-
dial holdings by the Indian police.10° Amnesty International, in an
amicus brief, provided evidence that the Indian government routinely
used extensive torture and forced extraction of confessions.' 0 Argu-
92. Id. at 1046.
93. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1043 (quoting ruling of Judge Ruikar, para. 320 at
384).
94. Id. at 1046.
95. Id. at 1046-47.
96. Id. at 1047.
97. Id.
98. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1048.
99. Id.
100. Id. These deaths, termed "false encounters," were said to be staged by police when
they summarily executed suspects they believed to have been involved in terrorist acts. Id. In
its opinion, the court quoted a Board of Immigration Appeals case that had reversed a prior
deportation decision. The Gill & Sandhu court quoted In re Bhajan Singh, No. A29-521-788
(May 30, 1990), stating that it was "abundantly clear that at least on four of the five occasions
when he was arrested, the applicant was placed under arrest based merely on his membership
in the [All India Sikh Students Federation] . . . [and] that he underwent torture during his
detentions .... Id. n.22.
101. See infra text accompanying note 190. The documented reports include a method
involving
the use of a very thick pestle or wooden log which was placed on the nerves of the
detainee's thighs. One or two persons would stand on the log and others would
Loy. LA. Intl & Comp. L.J [Vol. 13:1009
ing that this evidence should influence the court's decision, Gill and
Sandhu cited Barr v. United States Department of Justice,10 2 in which
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals stated that the federal courts
could not allow themselves to be placed in the position of implicitly
approving unconscionable conduct.1
0 3
The Gill & Sandhu court rejected this argument in favor of judi-




opened the door for the use of judicial inquiry. However, the court
stated that, although the Supreme Court and several circuit courts
had discussed the possibility of employing judicial inquiry in extreme
cases,10 5 none had found facts sufficiently shocking to compel the
court to invoke the doctrine.' 6
The Gill & Sandhu court pointed out that even courts favoring
limited review of extradition hearings continue to hold that there may
be some situations "in which a federal court might be called upon to
look again at the general principle of exclusive executive discre-
tion." 10 7 The district court found Gill and Sandhu's claims were, "at
least facially, that 'imaginable situation.' "108 The court further found
that the strength of the defendants' evidence substantially warranted
an evidentiary hearing and a re-examination of the rule of non-in-
quiry, as contemplated by the Gallina court." 9
rotate it thereby causing intense pressure on the nerves. The second common mode
consisted of stretching apart the legs of the detainee to an unbearable extent.
Brief for Amicus Curiae Amnesty International U.S.A. in Support of Petitioner at 23, Gill v.
Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (No. 88-1530) [hereinafter Amnesty International
Brief] (citing India: The Need to Review Cases Against 324 Sikhs, AT Index: ASA 20/03/88, at
10 (Sept. 1988)). Other prisoners have suffered torture by having their legs stretched wide
apart and chilies inserted into their anus. Id. at 24 (citing India:" A Review of Human Rights
Violations, AT Index: ASA 20/02/88, at 9 (Aug. 1988)).
102. 819 F.2d 25 (2d Cir. 1987).
103. Id at 27 n.2.
104. 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir. 1960) (habeas corpus proceeding challenging extradition, in
which court held arrest conditions were properly not considered and in abstentia conviction
did not require reversal of extradition order). In dicta, the court stated that it could imagine
factual situations which would shock the court's conscience and require reexamination of the
principle of judicial non-inquiry. Id. at 79.
105. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1048-49; see also Sindona v. Grant, 619 F.2d 167, 175
(2d Cir. 1980).
106. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1048-49.
107. Id. at 1049; see, e.g., Rosado v. Civiletti 621 F.2d 1179, 1195 (2d Cir. 1980); United
States ex rel. Bloomfield v. Gengler, 507 F.2d 925, 928 (2d Cir. 1974).
108. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1049.
109. Id The court was persuaded by a 1990 decision of the Board of Immigration Ap-
peals of the United States Department of Justice, which reversed a denial of political asylum to
a 35 year old Sikh man who had actively followed the religious teachings of the All India Sikh
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Nevertheless, the court concluded that it was unable to conduct
such a reexamination 10 because it was "bound" to follow the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals' holding in Ahmad v. Wigen I that "consid-
eration of the procedures that will or may occur in the requesting
country, is not within the purview of a habeas corpus judge."" 2 As a
result, the district court refused to conduct an evidentiary hearing on
the issue of India's possible antipathetic treatment of Gill and
Sandhu, and stated that those considerations should be left up to the
extradition judge or magistrate." 3
IV. THE CURRENT TREND OF NON-INQUIRY
Since Gallina v. Fraser, many courts have discussed adopting a
system of judicial inquiry without actually making such inquiry. In
1984, when the House Committee on the Judiciary proposed the Ex-
tradition Act of 1984,14 it labeled the present state of the common
law as a "rule of restraint."" 5 The Committee's report stated that
"[w]hile current statutes do not authorize the courts to examine either
the motives of the requesting state or the likelihood of persecution of
the person upon return, the courts have recognized their implicit au-
thority to make such inquiries in cases where the facts would 'shock
the conscience.' "116 In Gill & Sandhu, the court was almost com-
pelled to conduct judicial inquiry into human rights considerations." 7
However, the court was required to leave such inquiry to extradition
judges or magistrates and accordingly refused to review such evidence
on habeas corpus review. 18 Thus, despite the dicta in Gallina v. Fra-
ser that judicial inquiry may be compelled, courts continue to apply
Students Federation. The board stated that, "in light of the unequivocal evidence of record in
this case, we would have found it surprising if the applicant had not in fact been subjected to
arrest without charges, or tortured, so widespread does police lawlessness in the Punjab ap-
pear." Id. n.22.
110. Id. at 1049.
111. 910 F.2d 1063 (2d Cir. 1990).
112. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1050 (citing Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1063, 1066).
113. Id. n.23.
114. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
115. EXTRADMON AcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
116. Id.
117. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1048. The court noted, "This substantial, chilling
proffer from sources with at least surface credibility had convinced this court of the justifica-
tion for further judicial inquiry lest 'we... blind ourselves to the foreseeable and probable
results of the exercise of our jurisdiction.'" Id. (citing Ahmad v. Wigen, 726 F. Supp. 389, 410
(E.D.N.Y. 1989).
118. Id at 1049-50.
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the rule of judicial non-inquiry and leave the issue of subsequent treat-
ment of extraditees to the Secretary of State and magistrates."I9
A. Judicial Non-Inquiry
The concept of judicial non-inquiry is, in some respects, justifi-
able. An extradition treaty primarily seeks to return accused
criminals to the country in which their alleged criminal acts took
place in order to stand trial and receive punishment before a tribunal
of that jurisdiction.1 20 Countries welcome this practice as an opportu-
nity to remove undesirables and to obtain fugitives sought by their
own justice systems.' 21 Thus, the extradition process is based on reci-
procity and mutual respect of sovereignty. 122 Imposing a duty on
courts to inquire into the practice of other nations would unduly in-
fringe upon this sovereignty and thereby circumvent the reciprocal
cooperation that is essential to the extradition process.2 3  Further-
more, courts must consider whether preserving reciprocity in the ex-
tradition system is outweighed by the speculative ability to effect
changes in the human rights practices of other nations. Thus, courts
may reasonably conclude that it is inappropriate to inquire into the
practices of other nations' extradition hearings. 124
119. Id.
120. See id. In the "Additional Views" to the House Report on the proposed Extradition
Act, the senators wrote, "[T]he growth of transnational crime has forced us to negotiate some
bilateral extradition treaties with some countries primarily so that we can secure the return of
our own fugitives." EXTRADITION ACr REPORT, supra note 2, at 62 (emphasis added).
In 1984, the House Committee on the Judiciary defined extradition as "the process by
which one country may obtain the assistance of another country in securing the return of a
person who has allegedly committed a crime, or who has yet to complete a criminal sentence,
in the former country." Id. at 1.
121. States often deport aliens as undesirable or excludable under their immigration
laws; sometimes the effect of deportation is to return the person to a state where he
has been charged with a crime. It is generally held that failure to follow the proce-
dures for extradition is not a defense available to the accused in a prosecution follow-
ing deportation.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 475
(1986).
122. See Soering v. United Kingdom, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989), in which Great
Britain refused to extradite a German national, who allegedly committed two murders in the
state of Virginia, because he would face the death penalty. See infra text accompanying notes
127-131.
123. However, in Rosado v. Civeletti, 621 F.2d 1179 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856
(1980), the court stated that "although the Constitution cannot limit the power of a foreign
sovereign to prescribe procedures for the trial and punishment of crimes committed within its
territory, it does govern the manner in which the United States may join in the effort [through
extradition]." Id. at 1195-96.
124. In Holmes v. Laird, 459 F.2d 1211 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the District of Columbia Court
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Consistent with the rule of non-inquiry, the United States does
not entertain complaints from other countries regarding the nature of
its own criminal justice system. Therefore, the United States should
not expect other countries to heed its views on the appropriate treat-
ment of extraditees. The nature of modem extradition treaties sup-
ports this view. Historically, treaties between nations did not address
possible conflicting practices. 25  However, recent revisions and
amendments to such treaties have included articles that allow coun-
tries to refuse extradition under specified circumstances.126
For example, in Soering v. United Kingdom,127 the European
Court of Human Rights refused extradition of Jens Soering, a West
German national, to the United States. The European court stated
that since Soering was charged with capital murder, a Virginia state
jury would have the authority to impose the death penalty. 128
Although the Virginia district attorney claimed that he would inform
the trial judge of the United Kingdom's abhorrence of the death pen-
alty and request that the death penalty not be imposed, 129 the Euro-
pean court found this assurance insufficient.13 0 This conflict brought
the two countries to an impasse. As a result, the United Kingdom
refused to comply with the United States' extradition request.' 3'
The United States' refusal to offer greater assurances to the Euro-
of Appeals noted the difficulty and impropriety of a United States court reviewing another
country's judicial procedure with regard to crimes committed in that other country.
125. For example, the treaty in force between the United States and India, which is the
treaty that existed between the United States and Great Britain before India became independ-
ent, made no mention of what would happen if the countries disagreed on certain practices
that might occur after the extradition was completed. Extradition Treaty, Dec. 22, 1931,
United States-Great Britain, 47 Stat. 2122, T.S. No. 849 [hereinafter 1931 United States-Great
Britain Treaty].
126. See, e.g., Extradition Treaty, Jan. 21, 1977, United States-Great Britain, 28 U.S.T.
229, T.I.A.S. 8468. For example, some countries have the death penalty and others abhor it.
Article 4 of the United States-Great Britain treaty allows a country to refuse to extradite a
prisoner in the absence of sufficient assurances that the extraditee will not be put to death. Id.
at 230.
127. 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1989). The case was decided by the European Court of
Human Rights, which had jurisdiction over the case because the United Kingdom adhered to
the European Convention on Human Rights.
128. Id. 40.
129. Id. 20. However, the Virginia district attorney felt an "ethical responsibility to
request the death penalty due to the nature of the crime involved." Proprietary to the United
Press International 1989 (France), July 7, 1989, Regional News. The "grisly crime" in Soering
involved two graduate students who, as lovers, allegedly murdered the woman's parents in
response to their refusal to accept Soering. Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 13.
130. Id. 22.
131. Id.
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pean court resulted in the United States' inability to try or punish
Jens Soering within its jurisdiction. This unwillingness either to abol-
ish the death penalty or guarantee that it will not be imposed has
forced the United States to forgo other extraditions as well. The
United States' position in Soering, that its extradition requests should
not be denied on the basis of other nations' views of the death penalty,
is consistent with the rule of non-inquiry, whereby United States
courts should not refuse the extradition requests of other nations on
similar bases.
The main purpose behind extradition is to ensure the speedy re-
turn of an accused criminal to the requesting country to face justice.
If it is inappropriate to impose the views of another country regarding
punishment when deciding to extradite, it logically follows that a sys-
tem of non-inquiry into those practices should be preferred. Judge
Sweet's refusal to conduct an inquiry in Gill & Sandhu is consistent
with such a perspective.
B. Justification of Non-Inquiry
Courts have used two methods to counteract any unfairness re-
sulting from the refusal to invoke judicial inquiry: the double crimi-
nality doctrine13 2 and the probable cause determination.
The double criminality doctrine prohibits extradition on any
charge that would not constitute a serious crime in the laws of both
the requesting state and the requested state. 33 This doctrine pre-
serves the integrity of the bilateral nature of extradition treaties. It
also benefits the extraditing country by not requiring it to extradite an
accused for an act which it does not perceive as criminal. In addition,
the double criminality doctrine limits the amount of resources spent
by requesting nations by specifically defining extraditable crimes. The
process reserves these resources for cases viewed as serious by both
countries.
132. Although not labeled as such in treaties, the double criminality doctrine requires that
the conduct for which extradition is sought be criminal in both countries or states. Comment,
Extradition in an Era of Terrorism: The Need to Abolish the Political Offense Exception, 61
N.Y.U. L. Rnv. 654, 690 (1986). For example, the extradition treaty between the United
States and Great Britain provides that: "[e]xtradition is also to be granted for participation in
any of the aforesaid crimes or offenses, provided that such participation be punishable by the
laws of both High Contracting Parties." 1931 United States-Great Britain Treaty, supra note
125. See also Kester, supra note 5, at 1459. As a standard provision in nearly every United
States extradition treaty, the double criminality doctrine is a generally accepted maxim of
international law. Id.
133. Comment, supra note 132, at 690.
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The second safeguard built into the extradition process is the
probable cause determination. 34 Under this requirement, the re-
questing country must show probable cause that the accused is guilty
of the crime charged. 35 The United States Supreme Court has re-
quired the requesting country to show probable cause according to
United States laws. '36 As a result, the accused is protected from pros-
ecution for crimes in which sufficient evidence does not exist. This
also reduces the possibility of unfair treatment of an innocent person.
Arguably, this doctrine obviates the need for judicial inquiry by re-
quiring that the requesting country have reasonable grounds to extra-
dite. It has been argued that if the double criminality doctrine is
invoked and it is shown that probable cause exists, then judicial in-
quiry is unnecessary.
37
These two principles are not, however, unchallenged. One au-
thor criticizes the double criminality doctrine for lacking sub-
stance.1 38 In addition, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
inconsistently applied the double criminality doctrine in two recent
cases.' 39 Likewise, the probable cause determination, often relied
upon as a safeguard against unfair practices, has been criticized be-
cause extradition hearings often do not allow the accused to present
any meaningful defense.140 As Professor John G. Kester aptly stated,
"[D]eficient as it is in criminal procedure safeguards, the extradition
process has decidedly criminal consequences."' 41
134. See supra text accompanying notes 89-97. "If on such hearing, [the extradition judge]
deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge under the provisions of the proper treaty or
convention ... a warrant may issue." EXTRADrION AcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 43.
135. See Kester, supra note 5, at 1469 (quoting Charlton v. Kelly 229 U.S. 447, 462
(1912)).
136. See Exparte Bryant, 167 U.S. 104, 105 (1897) (appeal of circuit court's final order by
habeas writ, where Court held that evidence clearly showed appellant was guilty and that it
was ultimately up to the Secretary of State to make the final determination).
137. See, e.g., Ahmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1064 (2d Cir. 1990) (stating that the court
did not "necessarily subscribe to the district court's dicta concerning the expanded role of
habeas corpus in an extradition proceeding, which led to the district court's extensive explora-
tion of Israel's system of justice").
138. Kester, supra note 5, at 1461. Kester writes that the principle "often does not mean
much" due to its inconsistent application. Id.
139. Id. In Caplan v. Vokes, 649 F.2d 1336 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit reversed an
extradition order because the district court had made a conclusory finding of sufficiency of
charges. However, in Theron v. United States Marshal, 832 F.2d 492 (9th Cir. 1987), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1059 (1988), the court upheld an extradition where the foreign criminal stat-
ute was much broader than its United States counterpart.
140. See Kester, supra note 5, at 1470.
141. Id. at 1446.
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C. Problems with Non-Inquiry
Although a system of judicial non-inquiry purports to uphold
currently-held values in the United States 142 and to further safeguard
the extradition process, 143 it can fail to protect extraditees from polit-
ical persecution and fundamental unfairness upon their return to the
requesting country.'"4 The doctrine of judicial non-inquiry does not
sufficiently secure "individualized justice for persons charged with
political offenses as well as for potential victims of political persecu-
tion."145  The political offense doctrine'" is sometimes cited as a
means of protecting individuals accused of political offenses from be-
ing persecuted unjustly for political beliefs and acts. 147 However, due
to an increase in transnational crime that is not political in nature, 48
the doctrine is no longer a sufficient means of protecting all potential
victims of torture and other mistreatment. Additionally, the refusal
of courts to find certain acts "political" has resulted in the extradition
of many individuals to countries where they may be persecuted by the
requesting government. 14
9
Proponents of judicial non-inquiry assert that "the Secretary [of
State] never has directed extradition in the face of proof that the ex-
traditee would be subjected to procedures or punishment antipathetic
to a federal court's sense of decency," and that it is "difficult to con-
ceive of a situation in which a Secretary of State would do so."5o
However, the United States rarely refuses to extradite, and has done
so only in cases where a treaty expressly states the basis for refusal. 51
Many scholars are convinced that the Secretary of State should
not be making extradition decisions. 5 2 Some believe that the State
142. See supra notes 120-122 and accompanying text.
143. See supra text accompanying notes 132-135.
144. EXTRADMON ACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 59.
145. Id. at 58.
146. In the extradition context, a political offense is "a criminal act committed in the
course of, or incidental to, a violent political disturbance such as war, rebellion, or revolution."
Id. n. 1. Under the political offense doctrine, "a requested state may deny a state's extradition
request if it considers the crime to be a 'political offense.' " Comment, supra note 132, at 655.
147. EXTRADmON ACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 58.
148. The United States is currently facing a dramatic increase in international crime. US
Authority on Foreign Shores, L.A. Times, Jan. 16, 1990, at B6, col. 4.
149. See, e.g., Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981); Sindona v. Grant, 619
F.2d 167, 173 (2d Cir. 1980).
150. Abmad v. Wigen, 910 F.2d 1063, 1067 (2d Cir. 1990).
151. M.C. BAsslOUNI, supra note 5 (quoting Hyde, The Extradition Case of Samuel Insull,
28 AM. J. INT'L L. 307 (1934)).
152. EXTRADITION ACT REPORT, supra note 2.
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Department cannot be trusted to weigh the rights of individuals
against the government's own agenda due to the obvious differing in-
terests involved. 153 Indeed, federal courts may act as a buffer in these
situations and thereby enable the executive branch to avoid such obvi-
ously conflicting interests.154 An independent federal judiciary is bet-
ter able to make initial decisions about potential persecution in other
nations. 55
V. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSAL
The proposed Extradition Act of 1984 was an attempt by the
House Committee on the Judiciary to bring "more order and fairness
to the extradition process."15 6 Current extradition law was drafted
when due process rights were much more restricted than they are to-
day. 157 In response to these concerns, the committee proposed many
substantive changes to the extradition process. Most importantly, it
attempted to eliminate the rule of judicial non-inquiry and to impose
an affirmative duty upon the courts to deny extradition when the re-
questing country would persecute the individual or when extradition
would subject the individual to "fundamental unfairness."158
The hearing of the House Subcommittee on Crime' 5 9 focused
more attention on this judicial inquiry issue than on any of the other
issues contained in the proposed Act. The proposed Act provided
that a court could not extradite if it found that the individual had
established by a preponderance of the evidence that such individual
153. See Kester, supra note 5, at 1481 (citing Reform of the Extradition Laws of the United
States: Hearings on H.R. 2643 Before the Subcomm. on Crime of the House Comm. on the
Judiciary, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 34, at 81, 88, 418 (1983)).
154. EXTRADITION AcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 63-64.
155. Id. at 64.
156. Id. at 2.
157. See supra text accompanying notes 6-7.
158. EXTRADITION AcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 63-64. In addition, the Act proposed
that the Attorney General assume the role of the complainant in all extradition matters. Id. at
7. It also required countries to submit extradition requests only in federal courts. Id. The
purpose of these provisions was to ensure uniformity in the filing process. The Act addition-
ally proposed that arrest warrants be issued without knowledge of the accused's whereabouts
in order to prevent long delays in filing. Id. It also established standards and procedures for
the release of persons sought by requesting countries for extradition. Id. The Act also pro-
posed "temporary extradition" to the United States for those imprisoned in the requested
country. Id. Additionally, the proposed bill established a right to counsel for indigents and
permitted appeal of the extradition hearing. Id. Finally, it codified the political offense doc-
trine, the dual criminality principle, and required that accused individuals be charged with a
serious crime in order to be extradited. Id.
159. Id. at 30.
1991] 1027
Loy. LA. Int'l & Comp. L.JV
"would, as a result of extradition, be subjected to fundamental unfair-
ness."' 6 It also conferred discretion upon the Secretary of State to
refuse to extradite an individual after a judge had ordered the
extradition.161
The opposing sides on this issue argued for exclusive discretion
by either the judicial or the executive branch. Proponents of judicial
inquiry argued that "as impartial arbiters, [the courts] have an impor-
tant role to play in the protection of human rights and in ensuring
that the extradition process will not be used as a subterfuge for perse-
cution and unfair treatment."1 62 Conversely, those in favor of contin-
ued sole discretion in the Secretary of State argued that the decision
to extradite is a "political one, [and] that the courts lack competence
to review such a decision."' 63 Furthermore, they argued, "the Secre-
tary of State, unlike the courts, is able to avoid publicity in making
this decision and simply does not pursue requests based on political
motives."164
The proposed Act would have explicitly mandated judicial in-
quiry.165 This would have been a preferable approach for several rea-
sons. First, the discretion to extradite should not be left solely to the
executive branch. 66 The executive branch has obvious conflicting in-
terests in the area of foreign affairs. 67 It must adhere to its obliga-
tions as set forth in its extradition treaties with requesting nations.
The Secretary of State considers retaliation by other countries for the
United States' refusal to extradite. The Secretary is also subject to
pressure to maintain positive relations with other countries, while re-
maining sensitive to the human rights of extraditees.168 Because of
these important political considerations, human rights considerations
can easily be subsumed in the balancing process. Perhaps it is no co-
incidence that the Secretary of State has never refused an extradition
request explicitly due to human rights concerns. 169
160. Id at 52 (emphasis added).
161. Id at 55.
162. Id at 31. See also Banoff & Pyle, To Surrender Political Offenders The Political
Offense Exception to Extradition in the United States Law, 16 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 169
(1984).
163. EXTRADITION AcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 30.
164. Id at 66.
165. Id at 52.
166. Id at 62.
167. Id. at 64.
168. Id
169. See Kester, supra note 5, at 1481.
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In drafting the proposed Extradition Act of 1984, Congress
sought to prevent the "arbitrary imposition of severe punishment," by
imposing an affirmative duty to inquire into human rights considera-
tions.70 Proponents of inquiry argue that the Senate cannot ade-
quately safeguard against abuse through the treaty process.' 71
Opponents of inquiry argue that the United States would rarely run
into such problems because it refuses to enter into extradition treaties
with those countries that have fundamentally unfair practices. 172
However, this argument for non-inquiry lacks merit. The United
States has extradition treaties in force with countries that routinely
violate human rights, including India, Iraq, and Nicaragua. 173 The
number of United States bilateral extradition treaties has increased
due to the growth of transnational crime and the desire to obtain fugi-
tives from justice. 174 Consequently, the United States has given less
weight to considerations of human rights abuses by treaty nations. In
fact, the State Department's own Human Rights Reports include ac-
counts of various countries with which the United States has an extra-
dition treaty in which the fundamental fairness issue is strongly
implicated. 175 The reports include excerpts on Iraq subjecting its citi-
zens to "arbitrary arrest on political or security grounds," and Haiti
allowing beatings as a "traditional practice in Haitian jails."'1 76
Presumably, the State Department does reserve the right to ter-
minate treaties when fundamental fairness cannot be assured. 177
However, the United States has never done so.' 7 8 In addition, the
executive branch could refuse to extradite. However, such refusal
represents an understandably tenuous response. Such an act by the
government may give rise to unfavorable diplomatic repercussions,
170. EXTRADITION ACT REPORT, supra note 2, at 61.
171. Id.
172. Id.
173. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, PUn. No. 9433, TREATIES IN FORCE 116, 171 (1989). The
proponents of judicial inquiry have cited several examples of open extradition treaties between
the United States and countries which have abhorrent practices, including Turkey, whose gov-
ernment "admitted that 15 persons in a government custody had died as a result of torture."
EXTRADITION AT REPORT, supra note 2, at 62. Additionally, "the United States extradition
agreement with the Weimar Republic of Germany appears to have remained in force and effect
through the pre-war Nazi years." Id.




178. Id.; see DIGEST OF UNITED STATES PRACTICE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 534 (1980).
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and, in some instances, has led to retaliatory measures) 79 These un-
fortunate results may be minimized if the judiciary is allowed to act as
a buffer.180
VI. AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL PROPOSAL
The proposed alternatives to judicial non-inquiry seem to offer
little chance of advancement of human rights and dignity. Toward
this end, the human rights organization, Amnesty International,' 81
submitted an amicus brief in Gill & Sandhu.182 Amnesty Interna-
tional's brief called for the use of judicial inquiry and outlined human
rights abuses in India, especially in the Punjab, where the alleged
crimes of Gill and Sandhu took place. 183 The brief also documented
the deficiency of procedural safeguards in India, specifically with re-
spect to Sikh members like Gill and Sandhu.
8 4
Amnesty International was particularly concerned with what it
labeled "encounter killings."' 85 Encounter killings are killings staged
by police, resulting from an "encounter" in which the police were
forced to fire in "self-defense," or where the person died because he or
she "resisted arrest" or "tried to escape."'18 6 Amnesty International
characterized these falsified reports as mere "covers" for deliberate
executions of suspected criminals. 87 Encounter killings are most
prevalent in the Punjab,"' where Gill and Sandhu were to be extra-
dited. Amnesty International found support for these allegations of
abuse in the report of the Bains Committee'89 which reported that
"Punjab law enforcers were 'ruthlessly indulging in apprehending in-
179. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 475 (1986).
180. EXTRADION AcT REPORT, supra note 2, at 63.
181. "Amnesty International is an independent worldwide movement which works impar-
tially for the release of all prisoners of conscience, defined as persons detained for their beliefs,
color, sex, ethnic origin, language, or religion who have not used or advocated violence." Am-
nesty International Brief, supra note 101, at 1.
182. Gill & Sandhu v. Imundi, 747 F. Supp. 1028 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
183. Amnesty International Brief, supra note 101, at 5.
184. "Nearly 3,000 unarmed Sikh civilians were killed following the assassination [of
Prime Minister Indira Gandhi]. Since that time, and because of mounting reports of violence
involving the Sikhs, paramilitary forces, the Central Reserve Policy Force and the Border
Security Force were deployed in Punjab in March 1986." l at 7 n.5 (quoting India Execution
ofSatwant Singh and Kehar Singh NWS 11/02/89 (Jan. 12, 1989)).
185. Id. at 16.
186. Id. at 15-16.
187. Id. at 15.
188. Id. at 16.
189. Id. at 18.
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nocent persons and killing some of them.' "190 Amnesty International
concluded that Gill and Sandhu "could suffer similar fates if extra-
dited to India."' 9'
Amnesty International raised additional concerns about the tor-
ture and mistreatment of prisoners detained in India. 92 Detainees
and prisoners are commonly tortured in India, in violation of the In-
ternational Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 193 of which India
is a member.' 94 A 1977 police survey revealed 76,444 complaints of
torture in Indian states. 195 Accounts of documented, widespread, and
abhorrent practices clearly affected the court in Gill & Sandh u; 196 the
court found the evidence put forth by Amnesty International to be
"substantial" and "chilling."' 197 This evidence convinced the court to
conduct further judicial inquiry into the allegations in order to avoid
"blinding" it to the "foreseeable and probable results" of exercising
jurisdiction and possibly aiding India in the exercise of unconsciona-
ble conduct. 9 Although the brief did not advocate any specific pro-
cedural remedies, it did propose judicial inquiry into human rights
concerns as a method of avoiding unjust extradition. 99 In spite of
such convincing evidence, the rule of judicial non-inquiry in habeas
proceedings prevented the Gill & Sandhu court from inquiring into
the possible future treatment of the defendants.
2
00
VII. RECOMMENDATION: JUDICIAL INQUIRY IN
EXTRADITION HEARINGS
Judicial inquiry should be instituted immediately to prevent fur-
ther injustices to the due process rights of individuals in the extradi-
tion process. 20 ' Such inquiry can most appropriately occur during the
190. I (quoting India: Sikh Detainees from the Punjab Held Since June 1984, AI Index:
ASA 20/11/86, at 7 (Dec. 1, 1986)).
191. Id. at 19.
192. Id.
193. 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
194. See Amnesty International Brief, supra note 101, at 19; see also supra text accompa-
nying note 63.
195. Amnesty International Brief, supra note 101.
196. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1049.
197. Id. at 1048.
198. Id. (quoting Ahmad v. Wigen 726 F. Supp. 389, 410 (E.D.N.Y. 1989)).
199. Amnesty International Brief, supra note 101.
200. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1050.
201. See Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States: 1981-1983, 17
AKRON L. REV. 495, 571 (1984). Bassiouni states that such an imposition "could easily rely
on existing international instruments binding upon the United States," such as: the Universal
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initial extradition proceeding before the extradition judge or
magistrate.
A. The Extraditee's Potential Mistreatment as a Consideration in
Extradition Hearings
The potential mistreatment of an extraditee in the requesting
country is a significant problem inherent in the extradition process.
Many countries have expressed concern about extraditing individuals
to countries that they consider to have abhorrent punishment prac-
tices.20 2 Additionally, the principle aim of the United Nations Con-
vention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment 2 3 is "to strengthen the existing prohibi-
tion" of torture and other cruel, inhuman, or degrading treatment or
punishment by supportive measures. 2 4 Although all agree that po-
tential mistreatment must be considered, there is fervent disagreement
as to which branch of government should conduct the inquiry. 20 5
B. Inquiry into Potential Mistreatment by the Judicial Branch
The judiciary is the most appropriate branch of government to
engage in inquiries of abhorrent practices by requesting nations. Po-
tential threats to a defendant's life or well-being present complex
questions of human rights and equity which should be assessed by the
courts. Federal judges are insulated from political pressure and pub-
licity, which allows them to avoid making decisions based on outside
forces such as foreign relations concerns. The judiciary's insulated
position contrasts significantly with the Secretary of State who inher-
ently faces constant political and foreign pressure. Such pressure may
influence the Secretary to downplay the significance of potential
human rights abuses.206 Judges have the ability to impartially balance
interests of the accused against those of the government. Further-
more, since the courts may not be parties to abusive practices, even
when foreign relations of a sensitive nature are involved, 207 they are
Declaration of Human Rights; the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights; and
others. Id.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 127-131.
203. G.A. Res. 46, 23 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 39) at 395, U.N. Doc. A/51 (1984).
204. Id.
205. Some believe the inquiry should be left up to the Secretary of State, while others
contend that the judiciary should conduct the inquiry. EXTRADITION ACT REPORT, supra
note 2, at 34.
206. See supra text accompanying notes 167-169.
207. See supra text accompanying note 103.
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bound to ignore political concerns when the misconduct is extreme in
nature. As the court in Ahmad v. Wigen 20 8 noted, "[T]he courts are
not, and cannot be, a rubber stamp for the other branches of govern-
ment in the exercise of extradition jurisdiction. They must, under ar-
ticle III of the Constitution, exercise their independent judgment in a
case or controversy to determine the propriety of an individual's
extradition." 209
Although some courts have argued that potential extraditees do
not possess constitutional rights, 210 other courts have disagreed. In
Mathews v. Eldridge,211 the United States Supreme Court held that
due process requires the United States to afford a meaningful oppor-
tunity to be heard to all individuals who face deprivation of liberty or
property. 212 In Ahmad v. Wigen,213 the District Court for the Eastern
District of New York heard the petitioner's due process claim pursu-
ant to a writ of habeas corpus.214 The government, on motion, sought
a writ of mandamus to prevent the district court from hearing the
claim. 21 5 The court denied the government's request, and stated that
"due process of law requires fair procedures for aliens as for citizens
... in civil as in criminal proceedings, before administrative bodies
and in courts.1 216 The court also stated that such an inquiry
does not require us to impose details of [the United States] Consti-
tution or procedural system on the requesting country's judicial
system. It does entail an obligation not to extradite people who
face procedures or treatment that "shocks the conscience" of ju-
fists acting under the United States Constitution and within our
current legal ethos.
217
The court continued by stating that extradition may be refused if
a country has "substantial grounds" for believing a person "would
risk suffering other human rights violations. 2 1 8 After evaluating the
petitioner's due process claim, the Ahmad court found extradition ap-
208. 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
209. Id at 412.
210. See Kester supra note 5, at 1443-45.
211. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
212. Id. at 333.
213. 726 F. Supp. 389 (E.D.N.Y. 1989).
214. Id.
215. Id. at 395.
216. Id. at 411-412.
217. Id.; Rosado v. Civiletti, 621 F.2d 1179, 1195-96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 856
(1980); see also Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 122 (1901).
218. Ahmad, 726 F. Supp. at 411.
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propriate because no due process right would be violated.21 9 On ap-
peal, the Second Circuit concluded that "the Government's conduct
violated neither the constitution nor established principles of interna-
tional law."' 220 The district court's refusal to grant the government's
writ of mandamus and its insistence on evaluating the due process
claim supports the assertion that due process claims are appropriately
heard in the extradition context.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals established this proposi-
tion in In re Burt.221 The court held that the "petitioner's due process
claim could properly be considered in habeas corpus review of [the]
extradition proceeding .... *"222 According to the court, habeas
corpus review of extradition proceedings includes the consideration of
procedural defects as well as abhorrent substantive conduct in re-
questing countries. 223 Additionally, the court may address the extent
to which the United States would be assisting the requesting country
in such conduct by participating in the extradition.224 Finally, the
court recognized that other exceptional constitutional limitations on
extradition orders may exist due to "particularly atrocious procedures
or punishments employed by the foreign jurisdiction.1225 Therefore,
to prove the "atrocious" acts of other sovereigns, the accuseds must
be given a "meaningful opportunity to be heard.
'226
1. Due Process Requirements in the Context of
an Extradition Hearing
Mathews v. Eldridge enunciated several factors that courts must
balance in determining whether an individual has been afforded due
process in any given case. 227 These factors include: (1) private inter-
ests affected by official action; (2) risk of erroneous deprivation of in-
terests; (3) probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
219. Id. at 420. Persuasive in this finding was evidence that Israel, the requesting country,
had never before refused due process to an extraditee. Evidence also suggested that the peti-
tioner's current proffle would no longer invite pressure from police. Most persuasive, however,
was the Israeli assurance to the United States that if the petitioner was extradited, he would
"not be subjected to torture or other inhumane and degrading treatment." Id. at 417.
220. Ahmad, 910 F.2d at 1065.
221. 737 F.2d 1477 (7th Cir. 1984).
222. Id.
223. Id.
224. Id. at 1484.
225. Id. at 1487.
226. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 333.
227. Id. at 335.
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procedural safeguards; and (4) governmental interest, including the
burden of imposing additional or substitutional safeguards. 228
Applying the first Mathews factor, Gill and Sandhu clearly have
strong private interests in being heard on the potential mistreatment
that awaits them upon their return to India. Their interests concern
life, limb, and protection from persecution and torture. If Gill and
Sandhu are extradited to India, they may become victims of false en-
counters, torture, and abhorrent treatment. 229
Second, Mathews directs consideration of the risk of erroneous
deprivations of the interests as a result of the government's proce-
dures. 23 0 The current extradition procedures create a high risk that
an individual's liberty interests will be erroneously deprived. The ab-
breviated nature of an extradition hearing increases that risk.231 Mag-
istrates have unfettered discretion to deny any and all discovery
requests. 232 The lack of clear standards to guide the decision whether
or not to extradite contributes to possibly arbitrary and capricious
results. Moreover, when discovery is permitted, it is usually severely
limited.233 Most courts currently refuse to consider any documenta-
tion of possible mistreatment by the requesting country.234 In Gill &
Sandhu, the court refused to consider extensive documentation by
Amnesty International of past atrocities of the Indian government, as
well as evidence of potential persecution and torture faced by Gill and
Sandhu. 235 Additionally, evidence of previously fabricated criminal
charges against Gill and Sandhu was dismissed without considera-
tion.236 This limited procedure clearly threatens to deprive Gill and
Sandhu of their liberty interests.
The third Mathews factor to consider in the due process balance
is the availability of additional or substitute procedural safeguards. 237
The most obvious safeguard which may be afforded to extraditees is
judicial inquiry into possible antipathetic treatment by the requesting
country. The addition of this safeguard to the current extradition
228. Id.
229. See supra text accompanying notes 185-191.
230. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
231. See Kester, supra note 5, at 1443-45.
232. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1040. See also supra text accompanying notes 79-82.
233. See, e.g., In re Sindona, 450 F. Supp. 678 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). "An accused person's
right to produce evidence at an extradition hearing is limited." Id.
234. See supra text accompanying notes 114-119.
235. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F. Supp. at 1050.
236. Id. at 1049-50.
237. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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process would be of great value. If such inquiry reveals practices
which violate the fifth amendment's due process standards, a magis-
trate should deny extradition. In all extradition proceedings where
the issue is raised, the court should conduct such an inquiry and doc-
ument its findings in its assessment of whether or not the individual
should be secured for extradition.
Finally, when weighing the Mathews factors, the court must con-
sider the government's interest.238 The fiscal and administrative bur-
dens of imposing a duty of inquiry on courts is minimal. Procedural
inquiries into other countries' treatment and punishment practices are
commonly used in other areas of law. For example, in deportation
cases, courts consider the country of origin and its practices when
deciding whether to deport aliens or grant political asylum. 239 In de-
portation hearings, the court places the burden of proof on the refugee
to prove that the refugee's life or freedom would be threatened if de-
ported.240 Alternatively, to avoid deportation, the refugee can prove
that it is more likely than not that he or she will be subjected to perse-
cution in the country. 24' A similar system could easily be employed
by the courts in extradition hearings, as similar considerations are fac-
tored into extradition hearings. For example, the Gill & Sandhu
court received documentation of potential persecution and torture
submitted by Gill and Sandhu, Amnesty International, and the Bains
Commission. These documents could have been utilized in perform-
ing judicial inquiry. 242 Therefore, the standards already available and
utilized by courts in deportation cases, in addition to the information
routinely submitted, make the impact on the government minimal.
C. Judicial Inquiry Before the Extradition Judge or Magistrate
Extradition judges or magistrates should take the initiative at the
initial hearings to establish a system of judicial inquiry into potential
mistreatment. 243 This would require no legislative action.244 The ini-
tial extradition hearing is the most appropriate forum for making
such a determination. The evidence is presented there in both written
and testimonial form. The extradition judge or magistrate has the
238. Id.
239. INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1986).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Gill & Sandhu, 747 F.2d at 1048.
243. See id.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 114-116.
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best resources by which to make an informed decision about the possi-
ble mistreatment of an accused. Unlike the habeas court, which is
limited to review of the lower court's findings and not permitted to
analyze new arguments, the original extradition court has immediate
access to such information.
D. Post-Judicial Inquiry: What Happens if the Requesting
Country's Practices "Shock the Conscience?"
A final concern arises if courts adopt a system of judicial inquiry.
In cases where the court inquires and finds that the requesting coun-
try imposes abhorrent procedures or punishments, it must then decide
what to do with the individual. Arguably, the United States should
conduct the prosecution, 245 rather than surrender the person. to such
an oppressive or arbitrary system. However, this alternative raises
additional problems. First, since the crime for which extradition is
sought occurred in the requesting country, the requesting country has
better access to the evidence and witnesses necessary for a fair trial.
In fact, trial in the United States would disadvantage the defense due
to its limited resources by which to attain evidence or witnesses
abroad. Moreover, a crime in the requesting country might not be
considered a crime in the United States. Therefore, trial in the United
States is not a viable solution.
One way to avoid the inherent problems associated with trial in
the United States is to extradite the individual to the requesting coun-
try upon adequate assurances from the requesting government that it
will adhere to minimum standards of due process. If necessary, a
monitor can be sent to ensure that the requesting country adheres to
the standards to which it agreed by treaty or international law. How-
ever, it is possible that the requesting country will refuse to provide
adequate assurances to the United States. 246 In those cases, presuma-
bly a small number, the United States will have to release the individ-
ual or secure as fair a trial as possible in the United States.
VII. CONCLUSION
Extradition procedures in United States courts must accord ac-
245. M.C. BASSIOUNI, supra note 5, at 531.
246. The United States has likewise failed to provide adequate assurances in certain cases.
E.g., Soering, 161 Eur. Ct. H.R. % 22 (European Court of Human Rights refused an extradition
request by the United States because of insufficient assurances that the death penalty would
not be imposed).
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cused individuals due process of law before depriving them of their
liberty interests. The current rule of judicial non-inquiry com-
promises extraditees' due process rights by denying them a meaning-
ful opportunity to be heard. Some courts defer to the Secretary of
State, believing that such inquiry is a political question or that such a
deferral alleviates the need for judicial inquiry. Still others claim that
no inquiry is necessary because the United States would not enter into
treaties with governments that abuse human rights.
Proponents of judicial inquiry argue that these assertions are fal-
lacious. The Secretary of State does not adequately consider human-
istic factors, and rarely refuses extradition requests for any reason.247
Furthermore, the decision to extradite, when presented to the Secre-
tary of State, is primarily based on political considerations. These
considerations include: a presumption that the United States is obli-
gated to extradite under the treaty; the United States' desire for reci-
procity in extraditions; fear of retaliation if the United States refuses
to extradite; and the negative impact of a refusal to extradite on other
aspects of foreign relations. At the bottom of this list, if at all, is a
concern for the liberty interests of the accused.
Judicial inquiry will protect the due process rights of the ac-
cused. The procedures that due process requires are established by
balancing the factors set forth by the Supreme Court in Mathews v.
Eldridge.24 A great liberty interest is at stake in extradition proceed-
ings. In addition, little burden is imposed on the government by com-
pelling a system of judicial inquiry. The potential for retaliation
against the United States is limited because the decision will have
been made by an independent judiciary applying principled maxims of
constitutional law.
For judicial inquiry to be effective, courts must allow broad dis-
covery and hear evidence from bodies like Amnesty International.
These independent reports, often overlooked by the executive branch,
contain the most current and relevant information on the human
rights records of nations. In this way, United States courts can ab-
stain from any indirect role in the perpetuation of inhumane actions
by foreign governments. Moreover, the courts' adoption of broad ju-
dicial inquiry into foreign practices will be an affirmative step by the
247. See supra text accompanying note 151.
248. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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judiciary toward bringing United States jurisprudence in line with in-
ternationally accepted norms of human rights.
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